SUPREME COURT REVIEW
ture incorporated an objective standard in § 455(a) for measuring the appearance of partiality "to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process by saying, in effect, if there is a reasonable factual basis for doubting the judge's impartiality, he should disqualify himself and let another judge preside over the case."' 5 Furthermore, by making disqualification mandatory whenever ajudge's "impartiality might reasonably be questioned," the amendment eradicated the duty-to-sit.' 6 In this manner, the changes to § 455 codified each of Congress' stated objectives. Apart from the objective standard of § 455(a), § 455(b) enumerates specific circumstances, which if present, require a judge to recuse himself.' COMPARISON OF § 455 WITH § 144 28 U.S.C. § 144 was the first provision enacted requiring district judge recusal for bias in general. Section 144 was initially adopted in 1911 and remains relatively unchanged. It states:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceedings ... 18 17 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988) . Subsection (b) states that ajudge "shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding-(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy; (4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding-(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party; (ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding-(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding, (iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding." Id.
18 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1982) .
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Although the legislative history of § 144 suggests that it may provide for a peremptory and automatic removal of a judge on a party's motion, the courts have consistently construed the statute narrowly, thereby making disqualification unlikely. 19 Unlike § 455, § 144 is not self-enforcing. 20 Instead, the party alleging the bias must file an affidavit with the challenged judge stating "the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists." 21 Judges examining the affidavit must accept the facts as true, but may evaluate the legal sufficiency of the affidavit 22 To determine the legal sufficiency, the courts have imposed a "bias-in-fact" standard, as opposed to the "appearance of Rxv. 662, 666 (1985) .
20 See United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 880 (9th Cir. 1980 § 144 (1982) . Subsection (a) of § 455 requires an appearance of bias standard: a judge is to recuse himself in cases in which "his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988) .
24 Section 144 requires the party to file the affidavit ten days before the beginning of the term. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1982 In enumerating the requirements of § 455, Congress did not specify whether the source of a judge's bias affects whether it is reasonable to question a judge's impartiality. As a result, the circuits have been split over whether bias that results from a judge's involvement in earlier judicial proceedings concerning parties to a present action demands recusal under § 455.
The majority of circuits have held that the extrajudicial source doctrine does apply to § 455(a). 3 5 The D.C. Circuit as well as the Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have expressly refused to entertain a recusal claim where the grounds for bias stemmed from judicial proceedings. 3 6 Based on the presence of language similar to that in § 144, these courts have applied the extrajudicial source doctrine to § 455(b) (1).a7 Determining that § 455(b) is, in tram, a limitation on § 455(a), the courts have extended the extrajudicial source 29 Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 290-91 (3d Cir. 1980 The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have held that § 455 and § 144 "must be construed in pan mateia." 3 9 Therefore, "[dlisqualification under § 455(a) must be predicated as previously under § 144, upon extrajudicial conduct rather than onjudicial conduct." 40 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that § 455 and § 144 are complementary. 4 1 Accordingly, the same substantive standard of bias applies to both sections. 4 2 In the minority, the First and Second Circuits have concluded that Congress intended to abandon the extrajudicial source doctrine upon adopting the 1974 Amendments. 43 These Circuits rely on the plain meaning of the statute and the legislative history as the basis for this conclusion. 4 4 The test these circuits have applied, as first articulated in United States v. Cowden, 45 is "whether the charge of lack of impartiality is grounded in facts that would create a reasonable doubt concerning the judge's impartiality, not in the mind of the judge himself or even necessarily in the mind of the litigant filing the motion under 28 U.S.C. § 455, but rather in the mind of a reasonable man. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1975 ), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976 . Par materia is a rule of statutory construction stating that "statutes which relate to the same subject matter should be read, construed and applied together so that the legislature's intention can be gathered from the whole of the enactment...." BLAcK's LAw DicrioNAR" 791 (6th ed. 1990 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1980) . Moreover, the Ninth Circuit suggested that "the net result of the complementary sections is that a party submitting a proper motion and affidavit under § 144 can get two bites of the apple. If after considering all the circumstances, the judge declines to grant recusal pursuant to § § 455(a) and (b) (1), the judge still must determine the legal sufficiency of the affidavit filed pursuant to § 144." Id.
42 Id. at 867. In United States v. Olander, 584 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1978), the Ninth Circuit noted that it was incorrect as a matter of statutory interpretation to interpret § 455(a) as setting forth a different test for disqualification from that of § 455(b) (1). This is especially so because both the drafters of the ABA Code and Congress in adopting § 455(b) (1), were careful to follow the language of § 144. Olander, 584 F.2d at 882. Prior to trial, petitioners moved to disqualify DistrictJudge Robert Elliott pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).-50 Premising their argument on the fact that Judge Elliott had presided over a 1983 bench trial involving Father Roy Bourgeois, in which Father Bourgeois had been convicted of various misdemeanors committed during a protest at the same Fort Benning Military Reservation, petitioners alleged that § 455 (a) required the Judge to "disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 5 1 The petitioners' motion claimed that Judge Elliott had displayed "impatience, disregard for the defense, and animosity" toward Bourgeois, his codefendants, and their beliefs both during and after the 1983 trial.52 Specifically, petitioners pointed to the following actions by Judge Elliott during the 1983 trial, in support of their motion: (1) stating at the outset of the trial that its purpose was to try a criminal case and not to provide a political forum; (2) observing after Bourgeois' opening statement 5 3 that it ought to have been directed toward the anticipated evidentiary showing; (3) limiting the defense counsel's cross-examination; (4) judicial questioning of witnesses; (5) periodically cautioning defense counsel to confine his questions to issues material to the trial; (6) cautioning witnesses to keep answers responsive to actual questions directed at material issues; (7) admonishing Bourgeois during closing arguments that it was not the time to make a political speech; (8) interrupting one of Bourgeois' co-defendants during their closing arguments to warn him to cease introduction of new facts and to re- 55 In addition, Judge Elliott concluded that all other factual allegations relied on in the motion to recuse, and its supporting documents, were erroneous, in that an objective disinterested party would not entertain a significant doubt about the court's impartiality. 56 Following the denial of petitioners' motion, the case proceeded to trial. Judge Elliott agreed, at the onset of the trial, to allow defense counsel to state the political motivation behind petitioners' actions in their opening statements. 5 7 While the Judge also permitted petitioners to testify regarding their motivations, the Judge adamantly maintained that he would not allow long speeches discussing government policy. 58 When defense counsel began discussing events in El Salvador during the opening, however, Judge Elliott sustained the prosecution's objection and told defense counsel to limit his statement to what he intended the evidence to show. 59 At the close of the prosecution's case, petitioners' renewed their motion under § 455(a), adding "the judge's admonishing [of Bourgeois] in front of the jury regarding the opening statement and the Judge's unspecified admonishing [of] others" as grounds for disqualification.
60 AfterJudge Elliott's second denial of petitioners' § 455(a) motion, the petitioners were convicted for the willful destruction of United States property. Claiming that the District Judge wrongfully denied their recusal motion, the petitioners appealed. 62 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that "matters arising out of the course ofjudicial proceedings are not a proper basis for recusal." 63 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, 65 affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that § 455(a) is subject to the limitation of the extrajudicial source doctrine.
6 6 Justice Scalia reached this conclusion after examining the origin of the extrajudicial source doctrine, the doctrine's applicability to § 455(a), and its resulting implications on recusal jurisprudence and the facts of this case.
67
The Court first reviewed the history of the extrajudicial source doctrine to better understand its scope. The Court determined that Congress promulgated the extrajudicial source doctrine in response to 28 U.S.C. § 144.68 Requiring judicial disqualification for "personal bias or prejudice," § 144 contains language similar to the language in § 455(b) (1) . 69 The petitioners argued that because the word "personal" in § 144 provides the basis for the extrajudicial source doctrine, the absence of the word "personal" in § 455 (a) precludes its application to this case. 70 Justice Scalia rejected this textual argument, reasoning that "bias and prejudice [are] not divided into the 'personal' kind, which is offensive, and the official kind, which is perfectly all right." 71 Rather, the term "personal" is simply an adjective that emphasizes the "idiosyncratic nature of bias and prejudice,"-dispositions that are never appropriate.
72 Furthermore, the Court concluded that interpreting the term "personal" in the manner suggested by petitioners would create a complete dichotomy between court-acquired and extrinsically acquired bias, and produce absurd results.
3
The Court found that the origin of the extrajudicial source doctrine is the pejorative connotation of the words "bias or prejudice" in § 144.74 The terms "bias" and "prejudice" "connote a favorable or un- (1) and § 144, the Court recognized that the extrajudicial source doctrine clearly applied to § 455(b) (1). The Court then identified an equivalent pejorative connotation of the term "partiality" in § 455(a). 79 As a result, the Court concluded that the same extrajudicial source limitation in § 144 and § 455(b) (1), which derives from this pejorative connotation, limits § 455 (a) as well. 80 Based on the pejorative connotation of these terms, Justice Scalia concluded that the sort of "child-like innocence that elimination of the 'extrajudicial source' limitation would require is not reasonable.""' As a matter of statutory construction, Justice Scalia also explained that if § 455(a) did not contain a limitation which § 455(b) (1) contained, the statute would contradict itself. 8 2 Subsection (a), according to Justice Scalia, acts as a "catch all" section which both expands the protections provided by subsection (b), and duplicates some of these protections with regard to bias or prejudice, and interest or relationship. 8 3 Thus, within these overlapping sections, it would be inconsistent to interpret § 455(a) as implicitly eliminating a limitation 78 Id. 79 The Court stated "[p]artiality does not refer to all favoritism, but only to such as is, for some reason, wrongful or inappropriate." Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1156.
80 Id. The Court also noted that even if the pejorative connotation of "partiality" were not enough to import the "extrajudicial source" doctrine into § 455(a), the "reasonableness" limitation in this section w6uld have the same effect. Id. This limitation refers to the fact that § 455(a) only requires recusal when the judge's impartiality "might reasonably be questioned." Id. 81 Id. 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW specifically set forth in § 455(b).84 Though Justice Scalia held that mandatory recusal under § 455(a) is subject to the extrajudicial source limitation, he rejected a per se extrajudicial source rule. 8 5 Rather, Justice Scalia noted that it would be better to speak of the existence of an "extrajudicial source factor" rather than an "extrajudicial source doctrine" in recusaIjurisprudence. 8 6 Justice Scalia elaborated that a judicial opinion derived from an outside source is neither a necessary condition nor a sufficient condition for "bias or prejudice" recusal, reasoning that bias is no less offensive when it stems from ajudicial proceeding. 8 7 Thus, the Court held that there will be some circumstances where a predisposition developed during the course of a trial will suffice for recusal, 88 and other circumstances where a predisposition developed outside of the trial will not suffice.
89
Justice Scalia then discussed two implications of the presence of the extrajudicial source factor. 90 First, he noted that judicial rulings alone will almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion. 9 1 By themselves, they cannot show reliance upon an extrajudicial source, and only in the rarest of circumstances can they evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism required when no extrajudicial source is involved. 9 2 Second, opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceeding, or of prior proceedings, do not rise to the level of recusal unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. 93 Thus, Justice Scalia noted that, ordinarily, neither judicial remarks made during the course of a trial that are critical, disapproving of, or even hostile to counsel, the parties, or their cases, nor a judge's efforts at courtroom administration support a bias or partiality challenge.
94
In the final section of the Court's opinion, Justice Scalia applied the facts of the instant case to the foregoing principles. The Court found that the grounds for petitioners' motion, which consisted of judicial rulings, routine trial administration efforts, and ordinary ad- Although Justice Kennedy applauded the majority's departure from a per se extrajudicial source rule, he wrote separately to express his disapproval of the "undue emphasis" the Court placed "upon the source of the challenged mindset in determining whether disqualification is mandated by § 455(a)." 9 7 Justice Kennedy concluded that the proper inquiry under § 455(a) is the appearance of partiality rather than its origin. 98 Justice Kennedy agreed that, as an empirical matter, there is some utility to the distinction between extrajudicial and intrajudicial sources, 9 9 but he concluded that the majority took this distinction too far.' 0 0 He reasoned that the Court erred in adopting a standard which places all but dispositive weight upon the source of the alleged disqualification.' 0 ' Justice Kennedy asserted that the majority's standard is not a fair interpretation of the statute and is insufficient to serve and protect the integrity of the courts.' 0 2 Furthermore, he contended that in practice, the standard will be difficult to distinguish from the extrajudicial source rule that the Court claims to reject.' 0 3
Justice Kennedy further noted that the Court's standard, which asks "whether fairjudgment is impossible," 0 4 bears little resemblance to the statutory standard which Congress specifically adopted: 99 Justice Kennedy recognized that "doubts about a judge's impartiality seldom have merit when the challenged mindset arises as a result of some judicial proceeding." Id. at 1160 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Thus, the dichotomy between extrajudicial and intrajudicial sources does provide a "convenient shorthand to explain how courts have confronted the disqualification issue in circumstances that recur with some frequency." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring 
11
-Justice Kennedy further noted that one of the distinct concerns of § 455 (a) is the appearance of impartiality, whether or not § 455(a) addresses the alleged disqualifying circumstance. 114 Accordingly, § 455(b) does not govern § 455(a) as the majority holds.
115
Applying his construction of § 455 to the case, Justice Kennedy concluded that the actions ofJudge Elliott did not raise any inference of bias or partiality.
V. ANALYSIS
This Note concludes that the Supreme Court improperly applied an extrajudicial source limitation to § 455(a), because the text of the statute, as well as its legislative history clearly indicate that Congress did not intend the doctrine to apply to § 455 (a). Furthermore, this Note asserts that neither recusal jurisprudence nor public policy support the holding that the extrajudicial source doctrine applies to § 455(a). Rather, the proper standard for disqualification under § 455(a) is whether the charge of lack of impartiality is grounded in facts that create a reasonable doubt concerning the judge's impartiality, not in the mind of the judge or in the mind of the movant, but in the mind of a reasonable person." The plain meaning of the statutory language reveals that Congress did not intend for the extrajudicial source doctrine to limit § 455 (a). Rather, the language of § 455 (a) and § 455 (b) suggests that these subsections function autonomously.
In determining whether the extrajudicial source doctrine applies to § 455(a), courts must ascertain the statute's plain meaning by examining the particular language at issue and the language and design of the statute as a whole."" If the statute is clear and unambiguous, courts must give effect to Congress' unambiguously expressed intent and cannot pay deference to a contrary interpretation." 9 Section 455 is facially unambiguous. The plain language of § 455 (a) does not contain an extrajudicial source limitation. Subsection (a) demands that a judge recuse himself "where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.' 20 There is no stated requirement that recusal is mandated only in instances where ajudge's partiality arises extrajudicially, nor is there any indication from the statute as a whole that § 455(b) (1)'s extrajudicial source requirement limits § 455(a).1 2 ' The only logical conclusion from the plain language of the statute is that Congress in-
